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Sutton v. United Air Lines
Argued April 28, 1999
Decided June 22, 1999
THE FACTS
Identical twins Karen Sutton
and Kimberly
Hinton applied for pilot positions
with United
Air Lines in 1992. Both had extensive
experience
flying commuter planes and were
qualified
for the positions. However, both
also had
poor eyesight which, when uncorrected,
did
not meet United's standards.
With glasses
or contact lenses, their vision
was 20/20.
Because of their poor (when uncorrected)
eyesight, United rejected their
applications.
They filed a lawsuit in federal
court pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).
Under the ADA, a person is deemed
to be covered
by the Act's provisions if: (1)
they are
a disabled person within the
meaning of the
ADA; (2) they are qualified for
the position
they are applying for; and (3)
an employer
discriminated against them in
its employment
decision because of the alleged
disability.
THE LAWSUIT
In their lawsuit, Sutton and
Hinton claimed
that they were "disabled"
as defined
by the ADA, and that they qualified
for protection
under the Act since their uncorrected
vision
substantially limited their major
life activity
of "seeing." They also
claimed
that United discriminated against
them because
of their disability and that
they should
be given the opportunity to fly
commercial
planes.
United countered that they did
not view the
sisters as disabled, just that
the two did
not meet United's standards.
They made a
motion to dismiss, which the
trial judge
granted.
The judge wrote that including
poor eyesight
in the category of disability
would make
the term "disabled"
a meaningless
term; Congress did not intend
poor eyesight
to be included.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed
the dismissal. Like other courts,
it looked
to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's
interpretive guidelines to define
disability.
Congress had given the EEOC a
mandate to
administer portions of the ADA.
The Tenth Circuit followed the
EEOC's guidelines
for defining disability by considering
the
medical condition (poor eyesight)
without
regard to assistive medicines
or devices.
However, it rejected the EEOC's
approach
to determining whether the disability
substantially
impaired a major life activity
by saying
that corrective devices should
be taken into
account. The Court also sided
with United
in finding that the airline had
not regarded
the applicants as disabled. Furthermore,
the Court found that United had
not disqualified
the two applicants from an entire
class of
jobs, just ones as global airline
pilots.
ISSUES
1. Whether a person's physical
impairment
falls under the ADA's definition
of "disability"
if it can be corrected.
2. Whether the courts should
defer to the
EEOC's guidelines which say that
the determination
of disability status and major
life activity
impairment should be made without
regard
to corrective medicines or devices
3. Whether a person can seek
protection under
the ADA if an employer refuses
to hire her
because of poor eyesight.
ARGUMENTS FOR SUTTON
¨ The two sisters are actually
disabled in
the major life activity of seeing.
Corrective
measures should not be considered
in determining
whether poor eyesight substantially
limits
a life activity.
¨ Since the EEOC is in charge
of administering
the ADA, Courts should defer
to the EEOC's
guidelines rather than independently
impose
its own interpretation.
¨ Congress' intent was to determine
disability
without regard to corrective
measures.
ARGUMENTS FOR UNITED AIR LINES
¨ Sutton and Hinton are not substantially
limited in any life activity,
and hence do
not qualify for coverage under
the ADA.
¨ Congress did not intend for
all physical
impairments to be classified
as a disability
for the ADA's purpose.
¨ Sutton and Hinton are not excluded
from
a class of jobs, just the particular
job
they applied for with United.
They can still
fly for other companies and hold
other positions
within United.
MAJORITY OPINION
(O'CONNOR, J., delivered the
opinion of the
Court, in which REHNQUIST, CJ.,
and SCALIA,
KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and
GINSBURG, JJ.
joined)
The Court affirmed the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation
of the scope of ADA coverage,
and held that
the petitioners had not shown
they were "disabled"
within the ADA's meaning.
¨ The Court rejected the EEOC's
authority
to promulgate valid guidelines
for interpreting
the ADA. There is no need to
decide whether
deference is due to the EEOC's
guidelines.
¨ Three separate measures of
the ADA suggest
that the determination of whether
a disability
substantially limits a major
life activity
should be made while taking into
account
corrective measures. A disability
exists
for ADA purposes only where an
impairment
"substantially limits",
not where
it "might", "could",
or "would" be substantially
limiting
if corrective measures were not
taken. The
question of whether someone has
a disability
under the ADA is an individualized
inquiry
and should be made by looking
at the individual's
life circumstances. The EEOC's
guidelines
run counter to the individualized
inquiry
and treats people as members
of groups.
¨ Congress wrote in the preamble
that the
ADA was supposed to cover 43
million Americans.
If the Court sided with petitioner's
view,
then the ADA would cover more
than 160 million
people.
¨ Petitioners have also failed
to allege
properly that they are "regarded
as"
disabled under the ADA's definition.
Creating
physical criteria for a job does
not violate
the ADA per se. Besides, the
petitioners
were not barred from an entire
class of jobs,
just ones as global airline pilots
with United.
CONCURRING OPINION
(GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring
opinion)
Justice Ginsburg, while concurring
with the
majority's opinion, emphasized
the importance
of the preamble to the ADA. The
fact that
Congress wrote that (1) 43 million
Americans
would be covered by the ADA,
and (2) those
covered constituted a "discrete
and
insular minority…subjected to
a history of
purposeful unequal treatment
and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness"
suggests that they did not intend
those with
poor eyesight to be covered.
DISSENTING OPINION
(STEVENS, J. filed a dissenting
opinion,
in which BREYER, J., joined)
In order to be faithful to the
remedial purposes
of the ADA, the Court should
gives the Act's
provisions a generous, rather
than a miserly,
construction. Regardless of the
number of
people Congress thought the Act
would cover,
customary application of statutory
interpretation
should lead to the conclusion
that impairments
should be judged without regard
to mitigating
factors.
The majority's treatment of corrective
devices
would appear to exclude from
ADA coverage
those with such disabilities
as amputated
legs with prosthetic devices.
Employers could not be sued for
having legitimate
reasons for placing physical
criteria on
jobs, only if they discriminate
against someone
who can properly fulfill employment
tasks.
If an employer discriminates
despite the
fact that a person can perform
a job, regardless
of whether the disability is
poor eyesight
or not, their actions should
be actionable
under the ADA. This case is not
about the
reasonableness of United's standards,
but
whether petitioners fall under
the ADA's
protected class. Remedial action
should be
construed broadly so as to effectuate
its
purpose. The ADA serves to protect
irrational
decisions based on disability,
not all decisions
based on disability.
It is the majority's decision
that treats
people as members of a group
rather than
as individuals. By excluding
all people with
poor eyesight from ADA coverage,
they are
closing off relief without regard
to a person's
individual circumstances and
abilities.
If United regards petitioners
as unqualified
because they cannot see well
without glasses,
it seems eminently unfair for
a court also
to use uncorrected vision as
the basis for
evaluating petitioners' life
activity of
seeing.
DISSENTING OPINION
(BREYER, J. filed a dissenting
opinion)
While joining in Justice Stevens'
dissent,
Justice Breyer also believes
that if expanded
ADA coverage leads to many lawsuits,
additional
EEOC regulations can be implemented
to refine
the definitional lines. While
the majority
questions the EEOC's power to
do so, there
is no indication that Congress
sought to
deny the EEOC this ability.
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